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Abstract. The aim of the paper is to state a version of epistemic expressivism 
regarding knowledge, and to suggest how this expressivism about knowledge 
explains the value of knowledge. The paper considers how an account of the 
value of knowledge based on expressivism about knowledge responds to the 
Meno Problem, the Swamping Problem, and a variety of other questions that 
pertains to the value of knowledge, and the role of knowlegde in our cognitive 
ecology.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently, epistemology has focused on the question why knowledge is more 
valuable than mere true belief, or mere justified true belief? This question is 
rightly considered important for theories of knowledge, and for providing a 
philosophical understanding of our cognitive life in general. Any plausible 
theory of knowledge must be compatible with a plausible story about why we 
consider knowledge valuable.  
Current discussions on the value of knowledge feature a number of 
different accounts. A widely discussed strategy holds that knowledge arises 
from the successful exercise of the epistemic virtues, and that the value of 
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knowledge should be accounted for in terms of valuable features of the 
employing epistemic virtues.1 Williamson, in his book, suggests that the value 
of knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of the greater stability of known 
beliefs compared to mere true belief.2 Recently, Goldman and Olsson have 
proposed two distinct instrumentalist accounts of the value of knowledge. 
Others have taken a skeptical line.3 Kvanvig is a prominent contributor to this 
debate, and argues that there is no plausible account of the value of knowledge, 
and consequently he proposes that understanding, rather than knowledge, is 
valuable.4  
However, one approach that remains largely unexplored is the 
expressivist approach. Epistemic expressivism is a general view that applies 
expressivism to epistemological notions in so far as they have a normative 
component. What I will refer to as expressivism about knowledge holds, 
roughly, that to say that S’s belief that p is known is to express a particular kind 
of approval of S’s belief that p and of the epistemic position in which S holds 
the belief that p. The aim of this paper is to argue that expressivism about 
knowledge supports an attractive view about the value of knowledge. Among 
other features, an expressivist account of the value of knowledge is consistent 
with a range of considered intuitions about the value of knowledge, and it 
supports an intuitively compelling account of the role of knowledge and 
                                                
1  See the work by Duncan Pritchard, Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and 
others.  
2  See Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
3  See Alvin I. Goldman and E. J Olsson, "Reliabilism and the Value of 
Knowledge," in Epistemic Value, ed. Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
4  See Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of 
Understanding, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy (Cambridge, UK ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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attributions of knowledge, and the relation these have to the aims of inquiry. In 
part for these reasons, I think that the account of the value of knowledge that I 
offer has important advantages over competing accounts of the value of 
knowledge, though arguing this requires another paper.5 
Though I obviously think that there is something to be said in favour of 
that view, the aim of the paper is not to offer a full defence of epistemic 
expressivism, or even to endorse that view. The aim is the much more modest 
of detailing what expressivism about knowledge could say about the value of 
knowledge. A defense of expressivism about knowledge would require at least 
motivating expressivism about this part of epistemic discourse, and replying to 
the Frege-Geach objection to expressivist discourse. Moreover, Terence Cuneo 
and Michael Lynch have recently argued that epistemic expressivism face 
serious difficulties that are specific to the epistemic domain.6 Their claim is that 
because of the very content of the doctrine, epistemic expressivism cannot be 
coherently asserted or argued for. Jonathan Kvanvig has pressed a similar 
argument some years ago in a chapter devoted to a discussion of epistemic 
expressivism and the value of knowledge.7 I do not think that these latter 
objections are decisive, but for the purposes of the present paper, I will simply 
set aside this discussion and focus solely on the capacity of epistemic 
expressivism to account for the value of knowledge.8  
                                                
5  See my 'Getting the Meno Problem Right' (forthcoming) 
6  See Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web : An Argument for Moral 
Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Michael Lynch, "Truth, 
Value and Epistemic Expressivism," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research LXXIX, no. No 1 (2009). 
7  See Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of 
Understanding, 158. 
8  See my 'Is Epistemic Expressivism Dialectially Incoherent?' 
(forthcoming) for a rejection of the arguments proposed by Cuneo, Lynch and 
Kvanvig. 
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A brief overview of the paper may be useful. I section 2 I present my 
favoured form of expressivism about knowledge, and distinguish this view from 
a couple of related views. In section 3 I suggest how expressivism about 
knowledge may account for the value of knowledge. This is applied to The 
Meno Problem and the Swamping Objection in section 4. Section 5 is devoted 
to a discussion of certain questions that may be raised to the account. Finally, 
section 6 offers a few concluding remarks. 
2. Expressivism about Knowledge 
Some remarks about expressivism about knowledge are in order. Epistemic 
expressivism is not a widely discussed view, and neither are accounts of the 
value of knowledge based on expressivism. This is striking of course, given that 
the main question is that of accounting for a normative domain, and that 
expressivist accounts of normativity and value in the domain of ethics are 
feature so prominently in the discussion. Expressivism about epistemic 
discourse is the obvious extension of the forms of expressivism about moral 
discourse defended by Stevenson and Ayer, and more recently and with great 
sophistication, by Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. Gibbard and Blackburn 
have made suggestions as to how their views apply to parts epistemic discourse, 
and some others have proposed at least similar views.9  
                                                
9  See Simon Blackburn, "Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the 
Quasi-Realist," in Moral Knowledge. New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (Oxford University Press, 1996)  
where Blackburn considers moral epistemology. Gibbard suggests an account 
of attributions of knowledge in his Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live 
(Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2003), chapter 11. 
Recent work in which epistemic expressivism is discussed (though not always 
endorsed) is: Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of 
Understanding, chapter 7; Matthew Chrisman, "From Epistemic Contextualism 
to Epistemic Expressivism," Philosophical Studies 135 (2007); Cuneo, The 
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Hartry Field is an important early proponent of a form of epistemic 
expressivism, and he has recently restated his views very forcefully.10 As Field 
notes, debates in epistemology are often conducted under the assumption that 
epistemic evaluations are a kind of factual judgements that assess how much of 
'the justificatory fluid' is present in a particular situation or type of situations.11 
On the view that Field develops, epistemic evaluations are a species of non-
factual evaluations. There are fascinating and important details to Field's view, 
though this is not the place to discuss them. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, however, the important thing 
to note is that Field’s view basically concerns our assessment of belief forming 
methods. Thus, Field addresses attributions of knowledge only indirectly, and 
only subject to the further assumption that the evaluative part involved in 
attributions of knowledge is a function of the evaluative parts of attributions of 
justification.  
The significance of this for the present discussion is the following: the 
evaluation involved in saying that a belief is known seems to be rather different 
from that involved in saying that this belief is justifiably believed, and even the 
belief in question is true and justifiably believed.12 For example, saying that a 
belief is known normally involves judging that further inquiry makes no sense, 
                                                                                                                             
Normative Web : An Argument for Moral Realism; H. Field, "Epistemological 
Nonfactualism and the a Prioricity of Logic," Philosophical Studies 92, no. 1-2 
(1998); Lynch, "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism."; H. Field, 
"Epistemology without Metaphysics," Philosophical Studies 143 (2009). See 
also Matthew Chrisman, "From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic 
Inferentialism," in Social Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock, Duncan Pritchard, 
and Alan Millar (Oxford University Press, 2009 (forthcoming)). 
10  See Field, "Epistemology without Metaphysics." 
11  Cf. Ibid.: 249-50. 
12  Kvanvig makes a similar note, Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and 
the Pursuit of Understanding, 176. 
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and that one should disregard the possibility that the belief be false (or so I 
claim at least - see the discussion below). Nothing similar seems to be the case 
with attributions of justification. Saying that Adrian is justified in holding the 
belief that p is compatible with holding the evaluative stance that Adrian ought 
to continue his inquiry whether p is true. This is so even if, when evaluating 
Adrian’s epistemic situation, one knows p to be true. So, the pro-attitude 
involved in saying that a belief is known differs in this respect from the pro-
attitude involved in saying that a belief is justified, and a theory of what it is to 
attribute knowledge ought to reflect this. The kind of expressivism about 
knowledge that I set forth below allows for attributions of knowledge and 
attributions of justification to express distinct kinds of evaluations. 
In a recent paper Matthew Chrisman develops a strategy similar to 
Field’s.13 Chrisman’s main suggestion is that sentences of the form ‘S knows 
that p’ ‘could be understood as expressing our acceptance of particular 
epistemic norms, which when applied to a particular person’s belief entitle or 
don’t entitle the belief.’14 Thus, we can say that sentences of the form ‘S knows 
that p’ express a factual content that can be rendered as 
 
 (2’) S is entitled by norms e to her true belief that p 
 
The non-factual part of a knowledge claim, then, is the expression of 
acceptance of certain epistemic norms denoted by ‘e’. While there is surely 
much to be said in favour of the view Chrisman proposed, the view has 
inherited the problem identified in Field’s account. Chrisman’s account doesn’t 
clearly distinguish between accepting a true belief with some justification, and 
                                                
13  Cf. Chrisman, "From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic 
Expressivism," 242ff.. Chrisman has since refined his views on these matters. 
See his interesting "From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism."  
14  Cf. Chrisman, "From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic 
Expressivism," 241. 
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knowing that belief. Yet, again these epistemic evaluations do seem very 
different. Saying that S is to some degree justified in accepting the true belief 
that p, leaves open whether S is entitled, or even required, to stop further 
inquiry, or entitled or required to disregard the possibility that p is false in her 
practical deliberation, while saying that S knows that p does not leave this open.  
As mentioned, Field and Chrisman both seem to assume that the 
evaluative parts of attributions of knowledge derive from the evaluations of 
beliefs' justificatory status. I want to propose that attributions of knowledge 
serve to express a kind of epistemic evaluation that is distinct for knowledge 
attributions. I shall refer to this view as expressivism about knowledge. The 
main idea in expressivism about knowledge is to view attributions of 
knowledge as a kind of evaluation that applies to a subject in a certain 
epistemic position and a true proposition. Thus, to say that a belief is known 
(rather than, say, believed truly and with some justification) involves evaluating 
a subject's epistemic position with respect to a true proposition. Saying that S 
knows that p involves judging that S's epistemic position vis-a-vis p is, in a 
sense to be specified, good enough. Expressivism about knowledge holds that 
evaluation involves in attributions of knowledge is an expression of a pro-
attitude. And the kind of pro-attitude involved in knowledge attributions is 
distinct from other pro-attitudes that we express in other kinds of epistemic 
evaluations,  
Here is what might be a helpful way of fleshing out the view. Consider 
what I, for lack of a better name, will refer to as the k-norms. When applied to 
S’s belief in a proposition p, the k-norms roughly says that S should regard p as 
true, that S should exempt p from doubt, that S shouldn’t subject p to further 
inquiry (e.g. attempts to undermine or defeat p, or attempts to adduce additional 
evidence for p). Moreover, S should let p inform action in such a way that the 
possibility that p is false is disregarded. S should, for example, not be willing to 
bet on the possibility that p is false. 
One could, of course, wish for a much more precise specification of the 
k-norms, but it is not my aim to provide this here, and the discussion below can 
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easily proceed without it. The point of the k-norms, of course, is to specify a 
role that known beliefs (or beliefs regarded as known) play in our cognitive and 
practical life. One may debate the details of the k-norms, of course, but it seems 
fairly uncontroversial that knowledge occupies a rather distinct role in our 
cognitive and practical life. The role of knowledge is rather different from, say, 
that of beliefs that are justified but not known. My suggestion is simply that the 
evaluative expressive content of knowledge attributions should be understood 
in terms of the k-norms, whatever their exact content. Thus, basically, when we 
utter tokens of ‘S knows that p’ about a subject S holding a true belief that p, 
we endorse the k-norms with respect to S and S’s belief that p.15  
Before turning to the question of the value of knowledge, I want to 
make some further comments about expressivism about knowledge.  
Of course, when saying ’S knows that p’ we imply that S is in a 
sufficiently strong epistemic position with respect to p. To capture this further 
element let us introduce a notion of an epistemic position. Roughly, S’s 
epistemic position with respect to p is the set of possible worlds in which S gets 
it right with respect to p.16 This is a very rough definition indeed, and it could 
be replaced by more refined notions, or by notions that are roughly internalist in 
                                                
15  In response to this, one might suggest a fuller reading of ‘entitlement’ in 
Chrisman’s (2’s) above. The suggestion might go that to be entitled to a true 
belief that p by some epistemic norm is to have a permission (or obligation) to 
regard p as true, and to suspend further inquiry, and so on. I have no objections 
to this. The suggestion might simply that the content of being entitled by an 
epistemic norm to a proposition is provided by the k-norms. With this 
explication, Chrisman’s epistemic expressivism might be identical with the 
view defended here. Chrisman made this comment in personal communication. 
16  Cf. M. Heller, "The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck 
Epistemology," Nous  (1999). To keep the presentation manageable, I have 
defined epistemic position in terms of possible worlds. This isn’t essential, 
however, and many other ways of understanding epistemic position would do. 
 Expressivism about Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge  
Draft 24/11/09 9 
spirit rather than externalist, but for purposes at hand this characterisation will 
do. The important point is that, as the notion of an epistemic position is defined, 
to say that S is in a particular epistemic position is not yet to evaluate that 
position, or any belief of S as held in that position. In particular, to say that S is 
in certain epistemic position E with respect to p is not yet to say that S knows 
that p, even if E is in fact a very strong epistemic position with respect to p. 
However, not all epistemic positions are equally good. We therefore need ways 
to evaluate epistemic positions. Expressivism about knowledge may be 
rendered as the view that knowledge attributions express a specific kind of 
evaluation of epistemic positions. So when A attributes knowledge to S, this 
involves an evaluation of S's epistemic position, although perhaps not in the 
sense that A explicitly refers to any particular epistemic position. At a 
minimum, however, when attributing knowledge to S, A commits herself to the 
thought that there is some epistemic position that S is in and that this position is 
good enough to deserve the particular kind of approval expressed by A’s 
attribution of knowledge.  
The bulk of the epistemological tradition has assumed descriptivism 
about epistemic discourse, i.e. that tokens of ‘S knows that p’ and similar 
locutions are largely descriptive rather than non-descriptive. Moreover, the 
standard assumption has been that there is some distinct type of fact or type of 
epistemic state to be captured by correct attributions of knowledge. Let this 
view be factualism about knowledge. Expressivism about knowledge deny not 
only descriptivism about this part of epistemic discourse, but also factualism 
about knowledge. Thus, expressivism about knowledge claim that saying that S 
knows that p does not add anything factual to merely indicating that S holds a 
true belief in a epistemic position which one deems good enough. And 
expressivism about knowledge insists that there is no specific type of epistemic 
state that could be accurately described by true tokens of ‘S knows that p’.  
As is familiar from the corresponding debates in meta-ethics, one may 
devise notions of minimal factual content, such that tokens of  'S knows that p' 
express factual content or propositions, even though there is no robust 'external' 
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epistemic fact for felicitous utterances of such sentences to track. For the 
discussions lying ahead, however, we need not go into these further questions.  
Of course, for all expressivism about knowledge says, there might be 
highly relevant facts about the truth of propositions we affirm, about the 
reliability of various modes of reasoning or belief forming methods or about the 
truth of various principles we rely upon in our reasoning. There might also be 
facts about modal properties of believers and the beliefs they hold in various 
circumstances, or facts about probabilistic relations between beliefs or between 
beliefs and perceptual states or evidence of other kinds. Let us refer loosely to 
such facts as epistemically relevant facts. 
Expressivism about knowledge holds that attributions of knowledge do 
not merely report epistemically relevant facts. In addition, attributions of 
knowledge issue certain forms of evaluations of epistemically relevant facts, or 
of agents and their states of belief. Thus, though attributions of knowledge are 
themselves partly non-factual, they nonetheless depend on epistemically 
relevant facts such as those mentioned. 
Here is an overly crude example to illustrate the point. Suppose that S at 
t1 has acquired her true belief that p by some method M used in circumstances 
c1 and that M is very reliable, say 85%, when used by S in a certain class of 
circumstances C. Suppose that S harbours a range of higher order beliefs 
regarding the propriety of relying on M for the purposes at hand, and suppose 
that circumstances c1 are included in C. On the basis of this A attributes 
knowledge to S. Now, expressivism about knowledge holds that A's attribution 
of knowledge does not merely report the facts mentioned, that is, that S holds at 
true belief acquired by M, and that M is 85% reliable when used under 
circumstances C, and that S's actual circumstances c1 are included in C. Neither 
does A's attribution of knowledge report a further epistemic fact about S, say 
the alleged further epistemic fact that S knows that p. Rather, A's attribution of 
knowledge is an appraisal which serves to express a distinct kind of evaluation 
of S's belief that p as held in S's epistemic position. 
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Clearly, there are many kinds of epistemic evaluations, and it is 
implausible to hold that any of them are mere indiscriminate pro-attitudes. 
Moreover, some evaluations of belief states are not epistemic in nature and 
these also need to be differentiated from the evaluations characteristic of 
knowledge. Hence, we obviously need to ask what characterises the distinctive 
kind of approval involved in knowledge attributions.  
For expressivism about knowledge, the answer to this question is 
straightforward, and may be put as follows: ’S knows that p’ as uttered by A 
expresses k-approval of S’s epistemic position E with respect to p. To k-
approve of S’s epistemic position E with respect to p just is to endorse the k-
norms with respect to S’s belief that p as held in epistemic position E. Thus, the 
specific kind of approval or evaluation involved in attributions of knowledge is 
characterised by the k-norms.  
Contrast this with the evaluations involved in attributions of justified 
belief. Saying that some subject is justified in holding her belief is justified but 
not known is also endorsing a set of norms, or that the belief in question be 
treated in accordance with a specific set of norms, but it is a different set of 
norms. When saying that S’s belief that p is justified one endorses norms 
regarding S's belief that p such as: S may reasonably take p to be proper ground 
for action, though depending on circumstances S should consider the possibility 
that p is false, and S should be open to the possibility that more inquiry is 
needed. These j-norms, as we may call them, are clearly different in content 
from the k-norms. And assuming that the nature of epistemic evaluations are 
determined by the norms endorsed in those evaluations, we get that evaluations 
involved in attributions of knowledge are entirely different from evaluations 
involved in attributions of justified belief.17  
                                                
17  Compare Ibid.: 119 where Heller remarks: ’”Knowledge” is our word 
for saying that S’s epistemic condition is good enough when she has a true 
belief without saying exactly what that condition is’. I agree, but Heller’s view 
 Expressivism about Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge  
Draft 24/11/09 12 
In his book, Kvanvig voiced the worry that the positive endorsements 
involved in attributions of knowledge ought to be distinct from those involved 
in other epistemic appraisals.18 Clearly, expressivism about knowledge as stated 
here meets this requirement. We can see why the peculiar sort of evaluation 
involved in knowledge attribution is different from, say, the evaluation 
involved in saying that a belief is justified. 
Expressivism about knowledge follows the contours of the forms of 
expressivism about ethics developed by Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. It 
is important to note one point of difference, however. In the moral domain, two 
subjects A and B may accept different and incompatible sets of norms, and yet 
they may both count as accepting moral norms. A dispute between two such 
individuals may essentially concern which of two incompatible sets of norms to 
endorse, as distinct from the separate question whether some disputed issue fall 
under the norms. Hence, if A says that same-sex parenting is morally wrong 
there is a set of norms NA, such that A in her remark expresses her commitment 
to NA, and expresses her belief that same-sex parenting is prohibited by this set 
of norms.19 B, who says that same-sex parenting is not wrong per se, thereby 
endorses a different set of norms NB, and holds same-sex parenting to be 
licensed by those norms. Part of the disagreement between A and B is which set 
of norms to endorse. 
When we turn to attributions of knowledge, the picture is slightly 
different. Suppose two subjects A and B disagree about whether a particular 
                                                                                                                             
needs a friendly amendment: holding S’s epistemic condition with respect to p 
good enough by saying that S knows that p just is to endorse the k-norms for p.  
18  See Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of 
Understanding, 183, where Kvanvig questions whether Greco's pragmatic 
version of epistemic attitudinalism can easily meet this requirement. 
19  These sets of norms need not be complete, as Gibbard explains Allan 
Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings : A Theory of Normative Judgement 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990). 
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proposition should be designated as known by a particular subject, though 
neither rejects the proposition as false.20 Such disagreements do not normally 
constitute a disagreement about the proper content of the k-norms. This is for a 
good reason: one cannot accept a set of norms according to which one is 
permitted to doubt a belief, or to ignore it in one’s practical deliberation, and 
yet still hold that endorsing this set of norms has anything to do with 
attributions of knowledge. So, attributions of knowledge are tied to the k-norms 
in way that the attribution of a right or just action is not tied to any specific set 
of moral norms. Yet, attributing knowledge essentially involves expressing an 
evaluation that takes the form of endorsing the k-norms. 
I have used various expressions such as ‘endorsing’, ‘expressing a pro-
attitude’, ‘evaluating’, ‘expressing a commitment’ and so on to designate the 
relation between an evaluator A and the k-norms obtaining when A attributes 
knowledge to some subject S. I take these expressions to be more or less 
equivalent, but I have made no attempt to define them. One may, of course, ask 
more in detail what it means to endorse a norm. For the purposes of this 
discussion, I trust that we do not need to answer this question, and perhaps 
there is no answer to be given. Citing Gibbard, we might have to say that 
endorsing a norm is expressing a psychological state ‘that we are far from 
entirely understanding. We can hope not to define this state precisely, but to 
point to it’.21  
There is a lot to be said about why we might want to consider 
expressivism about knowledge, or why we more generally might want to apply 
expressivism to the epistemic domain. Most obviously, the epistemic domain is 
normative in various ways, and features of the epistemic domain seem to exert 
                                                
20  These are what one might call simple disagreements about knowledge. 
Of course, we often have complex disagreements, in which one disagrees not 
only about whether some proposition is known, but also whether it is true at all. 
21  Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings : A Theory of Normative 
Judgement, 55.. 
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a distinct type of motivational power. As is the case in the moral domain, it is 
not obvious how to account for these features, especially, of course, if one is 
inclined to metaphysical naturalism with respect to the epistemic domain. 
Simply positing separate epistemic facts does not really seem attractive; 
separate epistemic facts seem to be metaphysically strange entities, just as 
many have argued that separately existing moral facts would be.22 Reductionist 
accounts furthermore have problems of their own, problems that in many cases 
run parallel to those that have been explored in the ethical domain. The aim of 
this paper, though, is not to discuss these further issues. 
3. The Value of Knowing 
Turn now to the question of the value of knowledge. Expressivism about 
knowledge has fundamentally two things to offer in an explanation of the value 
of knowledge, or so I shall argue at any rate. First, treating a proposition in 
accordance with the k-norms is pragmatically beneficial, given the right sort of 
circumstances. This yields a kind of pragmatic explanation of why knowledge 
is valuable, or more valuable than, say, mere true belief. Second, saying that a 
belief is known is itself a distinct kind of positive valuation of that belief. 
Consider first the suggestion that, in the right kind of cases, there is a 
kind of advantage to treating beliefs in accordance with the k-norms. Suppose I 
am about to leave for the airport in order to take a plane to important meeting. I 
tend to believe that my plan leaves at 2 pm, but not really trusting my memory, 
I do not consider myself as knowing this. If I am wrong, I might not catch the 
plane, and I will miss the meeting. This suggests that I have another look at my 
booking, just to make sure. Suppose then, that that after checking, I now begin 
to wonder whether there is a misprint on my ticket, or that I have confused the 
ticket with some other ticket. Again, this suggest that I embark on new inquires, 
perhaps I should take other measures to forestall the loss I incur by missing the 
                                                
22  See the discussion in Cuneo about the parallels between expressivism in 
the epistemic and the ethical domain. 
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meeting. Again it seems that I should take account of this remote possibility in 
my theoretical and practical deliberations. Clearly, however, error-possibilities 
may be too remote to merit attention, and correspondingly, beliefs may be 
secure enough to discount the possibility that they may be false. And clearly, I 
may benefit from treating my belief about the time of departure as beyond 
further inquiry, or as such that the possibility that the belief is false is 
discounted in my practical deliberations.  
What this suggests, of course, is that we sometimes benefit by ignoring 
various possibilities that our beliefs are false. This is just the reason that 
applying the k-norms may benefit. Given a good enough epistemic position, 
treating a belief in accordance with the k-norms is valuable because this saves 
one from unnecessary inquiry, and because it reduces the cost of practical 
deliberation.23 Derivatively, being in an epistemic position such that one would 
be entitled to treat a true belief as known is being in a prudentially valuable 
position, even if one fails to benefit from this position because of a failure to 
regard the relevant belief as known. Let this be the pragmatic account of the 
value of knowledge. 
This is not the place for a comparison of the merits of different accounts 
of the value of knowledge, but it is worth briefly noting how the pragmatic 
account differs from certain other accounts of the value of knowledge. The 
pragmatic account stresses the pragmatic effects of treating a belief in 
accordance with the k-norms. Though related in spirit, this differs from 
                                                
23  Of course, the value of treating a belief as known may be outweighed by 
other factors, say the cost of bringing oneself in a sufficiently strong epistemic 
position. Moreover, even when other things are equal, there may be special 
circumstances cancelling the value derived from treating a belief as known. 
Consider a world in which an evil demon dislikes subjects that appear certain 
about their worldly beliefs and therefore severely punishes those that regard 
those beliefs as known but not those who merely regard their beliefs as more or 
less justified. 
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instrumentalist accounts holding that knowledge is valuable (or more valuable 
than mere true belief) in virtue of being instrumentally valuable (more 
instrumentally valuable than mere true belief) in certain ways. Alvin Goldman 
and Erik Olsson has recently proposed two versions of instrumentalism, one of 
which claims that 'the probability of having more true belief (of a similar kind) 
in the future is greater conditional on S's knowing that p than condition on S's 
merely truly believing that p.'24 The reason this is so depends on reliabilism, and 
the assumption that reliable belief forming processes are usually stable and 
usually applies to more than one problem. So, if one knows that p at some time, 
then one does so in virtue of a reliable belief forming process, which is likely to 
be stable and applicable in similar circumstances in the future. So, knowing that 
p at t is instrumentally related to acquiring true propositions in the future.  
A distinct but similar idea is that known beliefs are more stable than 
mere true beliefs, and this accounts for the greater value of knowledge. 
Williamson is the best known recent proponent of this view, the core of which 
he states as follows: 'If your cognitive faculties are in good order, the 
probability of your believing p tomorrow is greater conditional on your 
knowing p today than on your merely believing p truly today (that is, believing 
p truly without knowing p). Consequently, the probability of your believing p 
tomorrow is greater conditional on your knowing p today that on your believing 
p truly today.'25  
While both instrumentalism and the stability view may be right in their 
claims about how knowledge relates to certain other benefits, the pragmatic 
account focus on a different set of claims. According to the pragmatic account, 
treating a belief as a known belief is beneficial in the right sort of 
circumstances, even when this is not related to preserving one’s belief in the 
future, or the acquisition of other true beliefs in the future. I do believe that the 
                                                
24  Goldman and Olsson, "Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge," 28. 
25  Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, 79. 
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pragmatic account is more plausible than both instrumentalism and the stability 
view, but space does not permit further discussion. 
Expressivism about knowledge does not directly entail the pragmatic 
account, of course, and no doubt other views could endorse the pragmatic 
account of the value of knowledge. Indeed, as expressivism about knowledge 
only offers a theory of the content of locutions such as 'Adrian knows that p', 
expressivism about knowledge is not even committed to an expressivist 
rendering the distinct kind of sentences that could be used to attribute value to 
knowledge state, e.g. sentences such as 'knowledge is more valuable than mere 
true belief'.  
Nonetheless, I suggest that expressivism about knowledge and the 
pragmatic account of the value of knowledge go well together. Clearly, the 
norms featuring in the pragmatic account are natural phenomena, and we need 
an explanation of their nature, how they arise, how they are sustained, 
transmitted, and how they interact with our cognitive and practical life. 
Expressivism about knowledge yield just such an account, though I have of 
course made no attempt to show this account to be superior to other naturalistic 
accounts. 
Turn now to the second suggestion, that attributions of knowledge are 
themselves attributions of distinct kinds of positive value. This requires some 
explanation. First, the relevant claims in expressivism about knowledge are that 
attributions of knowledge involve endorsing k-norms regarding particular 
beliefs, and that endorsing k-norms is itself a way of expressing a distinct type 
of pro-attitude. This is why attributions of knowledge can be viewed as 
expressions of certain distinct positive evaluations. 
Second, consider the claim that endorsing k-norms involves a positive 
evaluation. This claim in turn requires further explanation. Epistemic 
expressivism holds that attributing knowledge involves endorsing a set of 
norms. However, endorsing a set of norms regarding some item doesn’t by 
itself imply that this item is thereby valued positively. For example, thinking 
that someone ought to be punished for a terrible crime is not to express a 
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positive evaluation of this person or his actions. So, provided that attributing 
knowledge involves endorsing the k-norms, why does attributing knowledge 
amount to a positive valuation?  
The answer, I suggest, is that this is because endorsing the k-norms 
concerns a prudentially valuable option, as noted above, whether or not the 
subject in question benefits from it. This means, in more detail, that when A 
takes S to be in a sufficiently good epistemic position, then A’s applying the k-
norms to S’s belief that p commits A to thinking that S is better off observing 
the k-norms. Due to these considerations it is reasonable to view endorsing the 
k-norms as an expression of a positive evaluation rather than a negative or 
neutral evaluation. 
4. Swamping and the Way to Larissa 
Consider now how all this applies The Meno Problem. This is the problem of 
explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Why is 
knowing the way to Larissa somehow better or to be preferred compared to 
having a true belief regarding the same, considering that both will take one 
there, should one decide to go? To make the question a bit more precise what is 
being compared, we may make use of the terminology introduced earlier and 
consider the following case (Case A): 
 
Adrian is in a strong epistemic position Es with respect to his belief that 
p, and Adrian regards himself as knowing that p is the case. Astor also 
believes that p is true, though he is in a weaker epistemic position Ew 
with respect to p. Accordingly, Astor regards himself as somewhat 
justified in his belief that p, though he does not regard himself as 
knowing that p. Suppose finally that the truth of p has equal practical 
importance for Adrian and Astor. 
 
The question is why Adrian's epistemic situation (where I take his epistemic 
situation to consist of his epistemic position with respect to p, the truth of the 
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belief that p, and the fact that he regards himself as knowing that p) more 
valuable than the epistemic situation of Astor? Both of them believe that p, they 
have at least some justification for that belief, their belief is true, and the 
practical import of the belief is the same for both of them?  
 It is worth noting how Case A differs from common ways of stating the 
Meno Problem. Often, in discussions of the Meno Problem, the question is 
taken to be how knowledge can be more valuable than mere true belief. This 
way of stating the question is unfortunate if it is not specified what a mere true 
belief is. Do we compare knowledge to an accidentially true belief or to a belief 
held with some justification though not enough for the belief to qualify as 
knowledge? Also, Case A specifies whether the subjects involved take 
themselves to be knowing proposition in question or not. The reason why this 
matters is that intuitively, S's knowing that p may have no particular value, or 
less value, when S does not consider herself as knowing that p. 
To avoid these kinds of problems, Case A specifies that Adrian’s belief 
that p is held in a strong epistemic position, whereas Astor’s belief is held in a 
somewhat weaker position. And it is specified that Adrian takes himself to 
know that p, while Astor does not. 
As we have seen, expressivism about knowledge supports the following 
answer. Adrian's situation is better than Astor's because Adrian is relieved of 
the cost of further inquiries, and does not need to accommodate the possibility 
that his belief that p might be wrong in her practical deliberations. Astor, by 
contrast, is not relieved of these additional costs. In addition, Adrian’s 
considering himself as knowing is a way for Adrian to express a distinct 
positive evaluation of his own epistemic position. And given that we, as 
evaluators of Adrian’s and Astor’s situations, also take Adrian to know that p, 
we similarly apportion a kind of epistemic appraisal on Adrian that is not due to 
Astor.  
Clearly, given the way Case A is constructed, we can see an obvious 
method for constructing new cases to which a theory of the value of knowledge 
should provide plausible answers. To start with, the two parameters to vary are 
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strength of epistemic position (this parameter may take the value of strong and 
weak) and epistemic self-assessment (subjects may take themselves to know a 
particular proposition or take themselves to be merely somewhat justified in 
believing it). Other parameters to include might involve Gettier-complications. 
A full account of the value of knowledge would explain if or why a known 
belief is more valuable than a true justified belief that would be knowledge, 
were it not for the occurrence of a Gettier-style incident.  
Analysing how an expressivist account of the value of knowledge deals 
with a range of these cases in comparison with competing accounts of the value 
of knowledge is the topic of at least another paper. Suffice it here to note that 
the expressivist account will emphasise the pragmatic effects of regarding 
oneself as knowing a proposition, and the sort of positive evaluation expressed 
when saying that someone knows.26 Some implications of this are worth noting. 
Suppose that Belinda is in a strong epistemic position with respect to the true 
proposition that p, yet she fails to consider herself as knowing that p. Belinda's 
situation then comes out as less valuable than that of Bertrand, who is in the 
same strong position as Belinda's but in addition does consider himself as 
knowing. Or consider Carl who is in a weak epistemic position with regard to 
some true proposition p, and yet regards himself as knowing that p. Clearly, 
there seems to be a sense in which Carl is better positioned than Calvin, who is 
in the same weak epistemic position with regards to p, but who does not 
consider himself as knowing that p. I such cases we might ask: when one's 
epistemic position is fairly weak but the target belief nonetheless true, why is it 
better to be regard oneself to be in a fairly weak epistemic position with respect 
to that true proposition than taking oneself to know it? I suggest that the 
account on offer should reply that Carl is in a sense lucky. Although his 
epistemic position is not good enough to warrant it, he regards himself as 
knowing that p, and due to luck he benefits from this. In a sense mistaking mere 
                                                
26  Note though, that nothing in the account on offer rules out that in many 
cases known beliefs are valuable for instrumental reasons or stability reasons. 
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justified belief or even unjustified belief for knowledge may benefit you – if 
you are lucky.27 
Yet another point worth noting concerns the modalities of the value of 
knowledge. Many commentators assume that the value of knowledge is a 
distinct kind of value - epistemic value - which is held to be different in nature 
and extension from prudential value. Often discussion of the value of 
knowledge proceed on some assumption of value monism, according to which 
only simpler states such as true belief has basic epistemic value. On this 
assumption, part of the problem is to explain how knowledge can have added 
value over that of true belief. In many passages Kvanvig operates with the 
additional assumption that the value of knowledge must be explainable in terms 
of the constituents of knowledge, or the similar assumption that the value of 
knowledge should be explainable by our preferred theory of knowledge. 
Clearly, these and similar further assumptions underlying various puzzles 
regarding the putative value of knowledge are quite contentious, and none of 
them seem universally shared among those working on the value problem.  
Clearly, the account of the value of knowledge based on expressivism 
about knowledge fails to respect a range of the further assumptions about the 
value of knowledge. For example, the expressivist account does not imply that 
knowledge is valuable in virtue of the constituents of knowledge. Though I 
cannot argue the point more here, I think it is unlikely that this could be turned 
into a strong objection against the expressivist account, and the reason is that 
these further constraints are themselves insufficiently motivated. 
Turn now briefly to the swamping problem.28 Suppose for a moment 
that what matters for knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Suppose, 
                                                
27  See the fuller discussion of these cases in my 'Getting the Meno 
Problem Right' (forthcoming). 
28  For discussions of this problem, see Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge 
and the Pursuit of Understanding. and L. Zagzebski, "The Search for the 
Source of Epistemic Good," Metaphilosophy 34, no. 1-2 (2003). 
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moreover, that some form of value monism is true.  This is the assumption that 
true belief is the only thing of basic epistemic interest, or the only basic 
epistemic value. Whatever epistemic value accrues to knowledge or any other 
epistemic state must be accounted for in terms of the value of true belief. The 
question then becomes how, given these assumptions, can knowledge be more 
valuable than mere true belief? This question is thought to be especially hard 
for the reliabilist. For the reliabilist, the difference between a mere true belief 
and knowledge lies in the reliable processes that produce knowledge. But if a 
belief is true and therefore valuable, how can the fact that it was reliably 
produced make it even more valuable? How can one explain this latter 
increment in value, given one’s commitment to value monism?  
As we have seen, expressivism about knowledge can sustain the view 
that, given the right kind of circumstances, complying with the k-norms is 
valuable. And attributions of knowledge are themselves ways of bestowing 
value. Of course, expressivism about knowledge is not intimately related to 
reliabilism. If reliabilism is taken to provide an analysis of the meaning for the 
word 'knowledge' and its cognates, then reliabilism and expressivism about 
knowledge are at odds with each other. Similarly, if reliabilism is supposed to 
provide a reductive account of knowledge considered as a distinct type of 
epistemic state, the expressivist about knowledge might deny reliabilism. 
Nonetheless, I take the basic idea in expressivism about knowledge to be 
compatible with the reliabilist insistence that what matters for knowledge apart 
from true belief is reliable belief formation. The most important epistemically 
relevant facts for our attribution of knowledge concern the reliability of the 
relevant belief forming processes. So, expressivism about knowledge can 
motivate why we should value reliably produced true belief in a certain way 
that we do not value mere true belief. 
Of course, one might suspect that this reply to the swamping problem 
simply denies one of the basic assumptions in the swamping problem, namely 
value monism according to which the only thing of basic epistemic interest or 
basic epistemic value is true belief. This, of course, is in a sense right. But it is 
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important to note the following: epistemic value monism derives much of its 
plausibility from the fact that, in our inquiry, the aim of inquiry should be true 
belief, and nothing but true belief. And as we shall see below, the expressivist 
about knowledge fully accepts this. So, while expressivism about knowledge 
denies value monism, it preserves the guiding intuition behind value monism. 
5. Inquiry, final value, distinct value and epistemic value 
(a) The role of knowledge in inquiry 
What is the role of knowledge in inquiry? And how does the value of 
knowledge figure in inquiry, if at all? Several years ago Mark Kaplan argued 
that knowledge cannot have the importance it is often assumed to have in 
epistemology. Kaplan wrote:  
 
  Imagine that you have been engaging in inquiry. Being a responsible 
inquirer, you have carefully weighed evidence and argument and have 
come to the conclusion that the weight of evidence clearly favours P 
and, so, you have concluded that P is true. Suppose you now ask 
yourself, “But do I know that P?” Notice that on the justified-true-belief 
analysis of knowledge, there is nothing to find out, nothing to do. 
Having already satisfied yourself that P is true and that the evidence 
supports your contention that P is true, you have ipso facto already 
satisfied yourself that you have justified true belief. From where you sit, 
determining whether you believe P with justification and determine 
whether you know that P come to the same thing. But then, far from 
being integral to your pursuit of inquiry, distinguishing the propositions 
you know from those you don’t know is, in the justified-true-belief 
analysis, a fifth wheel. ‘Knowledge’ turns out to be nothing more than a 
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honorific you may bestow on those of your beliefs which you consider 
justified should using the term ‘justified’ alone seem tiresome.29 
 
One main point that Kaplan makes is that, as far as inquiry is concerned, 
knowledge is simply not relevant. What matters for one's inquiry is being 
justified in the beliefs one accepts - any further question about knowledge is 
idle for one's inquiry. Though it might seem surprising in a paper on the value 
of knowledge, I believe that Kaplan is right about this. There is a very natural 
sense in which one’s prime concern in inquiry should be the target propositions 
of one’s inquiry and one’s putative reasons for accepting as true those 
propositions. One’s prime concern should not be whether one’s beliefs in any of 
those propositions qualify as knowledge. 
Now, Kaplan’s point would pose a threat to many accounts of the value 
of knowledge, as they may have to concede that while knowledge is valuable in 
certain epistemic senses, knowledge is nonetheless not important in inquiry. 
Just as knowledge, according to Kaplan, threatens to be a fifth wheel, the value 
of knowledge could turn out to be completely idle as far as our inquiries are 
concerned. Such an implication of a theory of the value of knowledge would be 
highly undesirable, I believe. 
One attractive feature of the account of the value of knowledge that I 
offer is that it can acknowledge Kaplan's point, and yet explain the crucial role 
that attributions of knowledge have in inquiry. Saying that a belief is known 
rather than merely believed with some justification is to insist that further 
inquiry is pointless and that the possibility that p is false should be discounted 
in practical deliberation.30 This, in turn, is to adopt a distinctive pro-attitude to 
                                                
29  See Mark Kaplan, "It's Not What You Know That Counts," The Journal 
of Philosophy 82, no. 7 (1985): 355. 
30  Note the similar remarks that Kvanvig makes about the aims of inquiry, 
in his Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, 
143ff. 
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one's belief, and the evidence one has for this belief. It is not, the expressivist 
about knowledge claims, a matter of asserting a further fact, access to which 
one may have due to a separate line of inquiry into the epistemic status of the 
belief.  
Here is a way to state the point. Suppose that I am interested in the 
question whether p, and thus inquire into the truth of p. Let us say that I engage 
in inquiry whether p. I conduct my inquiry whether p by assessing the evidence 
for or against p, by looking for more evidence for or against p, and so on. It 
seems that the guiding aim of inquiry whether p is to believe the truth of p (if p 
is true), and to believe the falsity of p (if p is false). Thus, the aim of inquiry 
whether p is not to decide the truth of the proposition expressed by 'I know that 
p'. Thus, the question 'But do I know that p?' is a further question relative to my 
inquiry whether p. And since I conduct my inquiry whether p by assessing 
evidence for and against p, the further question ’But do I know that p? seems 
irrelevant to my inquiry whether p. Even if, as a corollary to my inquiry 
whether p I were interested in knowing the answer to the further question ’But 
do I know that p’, then there would no separate line of inquiry that I could 
pursue to determine the truth of this proposition. In general, all I could do 
would be to reassess my evidence for p. So, it seems that knowledge that p 
plays no separate role in my inquiry whether p. However, this is misleading, 
since attributions of knowledge that p have an important role in inquiry whether 
p. Roughly, in inquiry whether p, saying that the belief that p is known serves 
to express the attitude that further inquiry is pointless, and that the possibility 
that p is false should be discounted in practical deliberation. Or as one might 
put it: If true belief that p (not-p) is the aim of inquiry whether p, then regarding 
one’s belief that p (not-p) as known is the end of inquiry whether p. It is where 
inquiry should stop. 
Note one more point. This account of the role of knowledge or 
attributions of knowledge in inquiry may also partially explain why the value 
problem of knowledge is generated in the first place. The value problem may 
arise from two conflicting intuitions. The first holds that what matters in inquiry 
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as well as for practical purposed is true belief, and whatever reasons we have 
for regarding a belief as true. The other conflicting intuition has it that it is 
somehow better to have known beliefs as distinct from, say, mere true belief. If 
one is in a position to designate one’s own beliefs a known, one is for that 
reason better positioned. The account of the value of knowledge accords both 
intuitions their due place, and explains why they are not in conflict.   
(b) Final value  
Many commentators think that knowledge has final value. An item has final 
value just when it is valuable for its own sake. This is distinct from items that 
are valuable for the sake of something else, say by being instrumentally 
valuable. Final value is also to be distinguished from intrinsic value. Some item 
is intrinsically valuable just if it is valuable in virtue of its intrinsic properties. It 
is important to notice that an item may be finally valuable without being 
intrinsically valuable. This happens when the item is valuable for its own sake, 
but not valuable merely in virtue of its intrinsic properties. On preference 
theories of value, for example, we may have a preference that some item exist 
for its own sake, and yet the value does not reside merely in intrinsic properties, 
but also in certain relational properties, namely the item being the object of a 
suitable preference.  
It is not obvious, of course, that knowledge really is finally valuable. It 
is not even obvious that we have a considered intuition to the effect that 
knowledge is finally valuable. Hence, it is unclear if successful theories of the 
value of knowledge need imply that knowledge is finally valuable. 
Nonetheless, it might be worth pointing out that expressivism about 
knowledge supports the idea that knowledge is, in a sense, valuable for its own 
sake, and therefore finally valuable. Here is how it goes. Suppose that I am 
interested in the question whether p. I thus inquire into the truth of p by 
assessing the evidence for p, by looking for more evidence for p, and so on. The 
object of this inquiry, we may say, is to believe the truth of p (if p is true), and 
to believe the falsity of p (if p is false). Given my inquiry whether p, knowing 
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that p (or knowing that not-p) is valuable for its own sake in just the sense that 
knowing that p is valuable, though not instrumentally valuable relative to some 
other goal which forms part of the inquiry whether p. As explained above, in 
the inquiry whether p, to know that p features as an end of this inquiry, as a 
kind of valuable end point that does not serve to realise some other goal that is 
part of the inquiry. It is not, for example, that we want to know that p because 
this is instrumental to the aim of believing p just if p is true. Contrast this with 
canvassing some bit of evidence that I hope will make me able to decide 
between p and non-p. Given the project of inquiry whether p, finding this bit of 
evidence is instrumentally valuable - it is valuable in the light of a particular 
further goal, that of believing the truth about p. Knowing whether p is not in 
this sense valuable in virtue of being instrumental to some further goal.  
One might object that since knowing that p is suggested to be finally 
valuable given the inquiry whether p, this really amounts to saying that 
knowledge that p is not finally valuable after all. But this would be a mistake. 
What the objection really says is that knowledge that p is not intrinsically 
valuable. The objection points out that the value of knowledge that p depends 
on certain relational features, principal among them that one undertakes the 
inquiry whether p. But the claim proposed was only that knowledge is finally 
valuable, not that it is intrinsically valuable. 
(c) Knowledge has its own distinct kind of value 
Another point worth noting is that expressivism about knowledge explains why 
the value of knowledge is special as compared to the value of mere true belief 
or mere true justified belief. This addresses what Duncan Pritchard calls the 
tertiary value problem, the problem of explaining 'why knowledge has not just 
greater degree but also different kind of value than whatever falls short of 
knowledge.'31  
                                                
31  Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock, The Nature and 
Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2009), 13  
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It is not entirely obvious, of course, that there is a pre-theoretical reason 
to think that there is a tertiary value problem, but for the sake of discussion 
assume that this is so. Consider for example the view that knowledge is 
valuable in virtue of the value of justified belief. This view implies that the kind 
of value that pertains to known belief is just the same as the kind that arises 
from justified belief, except that knowledge may generally contain more of it 
than mere justified true belief. The reason such a view may be held to be 
problematic is that we do seem to treat known beliefs quite differently from 
mere justified true belief. And there might even be some justified beliefs whose 
degree of justification is greater than some known beliefs, and yet we treat the 
known beliefs in a special way. This is what the tertiary value problem seeks to 
bring out.  
Expressivism about knowledge can easily reply to the tertiary value 
problem. The value of knowledge is special simply because arises from 
endorsing the k-norms rather than some other set of norms; so, the value of 
knowledge is different in nature of whatever value we bestow on justified belief 
or true belief, and the value of knowledge is not a function of these other kinds 
of value. This is what gives the value of knowledge its distinct nature.  
(d) Is this an account of epistemic value?  
One might reasonably wonder whether the account on offer really explains the 
distinctive epistemic value of knowledge, or whether it rather attributes only 
some form of practical value to knowledge. And if the latter, one might worry 
if this is a problem. Shouldn't an account of the value of knowledge explain 
why knowledge has a higher epistemic value than true belief, or mere true 
belief? 
 This is a difficult question, in part because it is not always clear what it 
is for some value to be epistemic rather than, say, practical. In any case, many 
contributors assume that the relevant kind of value that knowledge might have 
is epistemic value. Epistemic value is the kind of value that pertains to 
epistemic processes, states and properties, such as justified belief, true belief, or 
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processes of proper reasoning. One should, as an epistemic agent - an inquiring 
mind - prefer knowledge to true belief, other things being equal, not because 
knowledge may have greater practical value, though this may sometimes also 
be true, but because of the greater epistemic value of knowledge. Or so the 
assumption is, at least. So, epistemic value is thought to be a distinct kind of 
value that differ in nature and extension from prudential, moral, and aesthetic 
value. 
 Suppose we lay down as a requirement that successful theories of the 
value of knowledge explain the value of knowledge in terms of epistemic value, 
rather than some other kind of value. The account of the value of knowledge 
based on expressivism about knowledge could accommodate this requirement, I 
think. To see this, consider the two most obvious ways in which one might be 
able to individuate types of value. One way would be to individuate type of 
value in terms of the types of object being valued. Suppose we assume that true 
belief is an epistemic type object. Expressivism about the value of knowledge 
would have no problem with this assumption. In so far as the value of 
knowledge arise from the distinctive patterns of valuations that we bestow on 
true beliefs when held under appropriate circumstances, this value would be 
epistemic in kind, merely in virtue of concerning an epistemic type of object.  
 The basic assumption about how to type individuate value seems 
plausible in certain case, at least. Suppose that have been working on a painting 
for some time now, and that I now at last consider the painting complete. We 
can think of this as the adoption of a distinctive evaluative attitude to the 
painting, and attitude which include that I think of the painting has having 
reached its final aesthetic form in terms of colours, texture, shape and so on.  
By adopting this attitude, I urge myself to stop worrying about other ways I 
could have expressed my ideas, or other shades or nuances I could add to the 
painting, and I express my readiness for considering the painting for exhibition 
or for sale. Suppose we say that by considering the painting as complete, I 
adopt a distinctive evaluative attitude to the painting, and suppose that this 
bestows value on the painting. It seems, of course, that the evaluative attitude 
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and the value generated is aesthetic in kind. What makes it so, we can ask? One 
answer seems quite tempting: the valuational stance I adopt to the painting is 
aesthetic in kind in virtue of the kind of object is has. The painting is an aethetic 
object. Had I adopted an evaluative stance with the same structure to a very 
different kind of object, the resulting value might have been different in type. 
 Despite this, type individuation of valuational stances in terms the type 
of their objects may not be plausible in all cases. After all, one can desire that a 
belief be true for aesthetic reasons, or prefer to own one painting rather than 
another for monetary reasons, which are distinct from aesthetic reasons. So, 
surely, one can value aesthetic objects without turning one's valuing into an 
aesthetic kind of valuing. 
 So, maybe a more plausible view is functionalist in nature, holding that 
what makes something an evaluative attitude of an epistemic kind is a matter of 
the role it plays in our intellectual ecology, as it were.32 Similarly, what makes 
some value epistemic rather than aesthetic is a question of how our general 
attitudes to this value relates to epistemic endeavours. This type of view about 
type individuation may be more plausible. But again, assuming that this is the 
correct way to individuate types of value, we surely get that expressivism about 
the value of knowledge accrues epistemic value to knowledge. The evaluational 
attitude that is central to expressivism about the value of knowledge is 
epistemic in character in virtue of relating firmly to epistemic notions such as 
evidence and inquiry. 
(e) Why knowledge is also of greater practical value 
One final remark on the practical value of knowledge. Whatever one thinks 
about epistemic value of knowledge there is a parallel problem concerning the 
practical value of knowledge. Under one interpretation, this is part of what the 
Meno Problem brings out. The Meno Problem arises from realising that 
                                                
32  Kaplan's expression, see Mark Kaplan, "Critical Study: Who Cares 
What You Know?," The Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 210 (2003): 106. 
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knowing the way to Larissa appears to be of no greater practical use than 
having a mere true belief to the same effect. Both epistemic states will bring 
one equally safely and expediently to Larissa, should one decide to go. Yet, 
there is nonetheless a sense that knowing the way to Larissa seems somehow 
practically better than merely having a true belief regarding this matter (or so 
one might argue, at least). On reflection, however, it is not obvious why this is 
so. After all, what seems to matter from a practical point of view is true belief, 
and all mere true belief and mere true justified belief feature that just as well as 
knowledge. 
If this is right, it is not as if we have to make a choice between 
accounting for the greater epistemic value of knowledge on the one hand, and 
the greater practical value, on the other. Rather, it seems plausible that the value 
problem for knowledge concerns two dimensions of value, epistemic value and 
practical value. Both pose parallel but distinct challenges. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this paper has not been to defend epistemic expressivism, or even 
endorse this view. At this early stage in the discussion, I have only sought to 
develop how this kind of view may account for the value of knowledge. Further 
important questions concerns whether an account of the value of knowledge 
based on expressivism about knowledge is better or at least as good as other 
accounts of the value or knowledge. And, of course, a crucial question is 
whether expressivism about knowledge is a sufficiently motivated view.33  
                                                
33  Earlier versions of material in this paper were presented at Danish 
Epistemology Network workshops in 2006, at the Amsterdam Conference on 
the Value of Knowledge, August 2007, The European Epistemology Network 
Meeting in Geneva, September 2007, and at the Analytic Philosophy 
Workshop, Amsterdam, January 2008. The most direct ancestor to this paper 
were presented at the Bled Epistemology Conference in 2009. I would like to 
thank all the audiences for stimulating discussions and important suggestions, 
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in particular Martijn Blauw, Matthew Chrisman, Mikkel Gerken, Sanford 
Goldberg, David Henderson, Jesper Kallestrup, Jennifer Lackey, Adam Morton, 
Erik Olsson, Christian Piller, Duncan Pritchard, and Michael Ridge. Thanks to 
an anonymous referee for Acta Analytica who made some very helpful 
suggestions. 
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